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CIVL RIGHTS, POLICY DIFFUSION AND THE COEVOLUTION OF IMMIGRATION AND 
PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE AMERICAN FOOD SYSTEM 
 
 
This research uses the ‘policy diffusion framework’ to analyze the mechanisms and 
motivations behind policymaking in the American food system and draw conclusions about the 
relationship between the policy process and civil rights.  It also utilizes analytical concepts lent 
by historic institutionalism such as process tracing and critical junctures to create a narrative of 
policy evolution from a cross-case analysis of the most salient issues facing the food system 
including immigration and public health policies.  A case study of the northern Colorado food 
system details a series of policy adoptions in these issue areas, offering metrics for measuring 
equality.  I hypothesize that the policy diffusion process in the real world has a causal 
relationship with the civil rights of immigrants and migrants working in food service.  I ask the 
research question, what is the relationship between the policymaking process and civil rights in 
the food system, and what mechanisms of policy diffusion are active?  I find that the policy 
diffusion process has the best outcomes for civil equality when there is a diversity of 
stakeholders who take a collaborative approach to the process and share information quickly and 
often.  But, when decisionmakers bias the process by excluding or favoring sets of stakeholders, 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
 
This research uses the ‘policy diffusion framework’ to analyze the mechanisms and 
motivations behind policymaking in the American food system in order to draw conclusions 
about the relationship between the policy process and civil rights.  It also utilizes analytical 
concepts lent by historic institutionalism such as process tracing and critical juncture theory to 
create a narrative of policy evolution in a cross-case analysis of the most salient issues facing the 
food system including immigration and public health policies.  The food system can be thought 
of as anything and anyone who is involved in the production, distribution, and consumption of 
food.  We are all members of the food system to a degree.   
When it comes to studying equality in American food processing, issues of immigration, 
public health, and labor policy overlap one another in critical ways.  A case study of northern 
Colorado details a series of policy adoptions in each of these issue areas from the past twenty 
years and is a basis for measuring equality.  I hypothesize that the policy diffusion process in 
real-time has measurable impacts on equality in the food system.  I ask the research question, 
what is the relationship between policy and equal rights in the food system, and what 
mechanisms of the policy diffusion framework are active?  I find that the policy diffusion 
process has the best outcomes for civil equality when there is a diversity of stakeholders who 
take a collaborative approach to the process and share information quickly and often.  But, when 
decisionmakers bias the process by excluding or favoring sets of stakeholders, then the flow of 
information diminished and policy outcomes negatively affect civil equality.  At a conference 
hosted by Colorado State University in January of 2020, inadequate public policies and issues of 
equality were agreed upon as the most important problems facing the system (Colorado Food 
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Summit, January 2020).  Years of failed immigration policies and public health crises like 
Covid-19 outbreaks in processing facilities threaten the sustainability and resiliency of the food 
system. 
The policy diffusion framework is well suited to tackle this topic matter.  To root out 
systemic inequalities deeply entrenched in the food system, then research needs to weed through 
the policy process on a case-by-case basis, something that’s sore easily accomplished with the 
help of a theory like this.  Hal Holbrook, known as “Deep Throat” in All the President’s Men 
coined the famous adage “just follow the money” to expose corruption.  But in these cases, it is 
as important to follow the policy.  The literature directs the researcher to focus on the 
relationships between government agencies and jurisdictions, specifically how they communicate 
and influence policy decisions, as opposed to studying agencies and policy adoptions as being 
autonomous from one another (Berry and Berry, 2018).  The vast majority of policies, it asserts, 
are not original creations, but are transfers or mutations of policies that have already been 
implemented by another jurisdiction or agency.  What is drawn out through the case study is that 
the ways in which policies are made, specifically how they are diffused from one unit to another, 
has an impact on the quality of the policy outcome.  Most policy adoptions are influenced by 
other units of government, and are shaped by a sequence of critical moments in history. 
The United States is a world leader in agricultural production, but would not be so were it 
not for the contributions of generations of migrant and immigrant laborers.  Unfortunately, the 
exploitation of these workers based on race and citizenship status has long been unchecked or 
enabled by government policy.  Current events demonstrate that the historic fight for civil rights 
in America’s food sector is far from over.  I learned that progress in this realm has and always 
will hinge on grassroots participation in the policy process.  With guidance from the policy 
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diffusion framework, the case study takes inventory of the current status of civil rights and 
equality in the food system, and is connected to the longer history of the Civil Rights Movement. 
Food processing and distribution in the United States has made strides in health, safety 
and equality since Upton Sinclair’s historic 1906 novel “The Jungle” exposed abhorrent working 
and living conditions in Chicago’s meatpacking districts.  His accounts of conditions in the 
plants shocked American consumers and was justification for the Pure Food and Drug Act of 
1906.  The legislation set an early precedent for government’s role in protecting the health and 
safety of workers and consumers, paving the way for agencies like Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and the Occupational Safety and Hazard Administration (FDA, 2019).  
Beginning in the 1950s and through the 1970s, the Chicano Movement organized Latino and 
immigrant farmworkers first in California and then across the nation.  Monumental labor and 
civil rights victories were again realized for food system workers via policy change.  Yet, 
research shows the food system is still mired in lasting inequalities for immigrant communities 
and people of color at every point of the supply chain (Solis, 2020).   
Although policy change has always been a necessary catalyst for positive change in the 
food system, it has also been a cause of its lapses.  In the first two cases, involving early 2000s 
immigration reform and policy responses to Covid-19 outbreaks in meatpacking facilities in 
2020, the framework reveals the clearest examples of how the policy process can be liable for 
tragic civil rights violations when communication mechanisms are compromised.  The first case I 
analyze follows the policy evolution of Secure Communities, a post 9/11 policy creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and enforced by Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE).  It was an instrument for the largest immigration raids at workplaces in the 
nation’s history (Kammer, 2009).  Diffusion into lower levels of government was accomplished 
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through coercive tactics and justified by nativist sentiment in the wake of the September 11th 
terrorist attacks.  When this tactic proved responsible for egregious civil rights violations by the 
DHS’s own admission, the policy diffusion process took an intriguing turn towards a more 
appropriate immigration enforcement policy (DHS, 2011).   
The second case traces the policy response to Covid-19 outbreaks at meatpacking 
facilities in 2020.  Effective responses were muddled by incompatible policy adoptions at 
different levels of government.  Six workers were killed and hundreds more infected at the JBS 
Beef plant in Greeley, Colorado, making it the deadliest Covid-19 outbreak at a food processing 
facility; all six were either immigrants or refugees of Latino or Asian descent, prompting 
inquiries at the federal level into civil rights violations, including an entire House select-
subcommittee focused solely on the meatpacking industry (Clyburn, 2021).  Evidence is 
mounting that the magnitude of the outbreaks in food processing facilities could have been 
lessened, but both corporate and government officials jeopardized the health and safety of 
workers (Newell and Sinclair, 7/2020).  The initial policy response by state and local health 
officials was rebutted by the White House and agencies like the CDC, and a lack of 
communication was at the center of policy failures (Newell and Sinclair, 7/2020).   
Despite the fact that there are several large food processing facilities including the JBS 
Swift Beef plant on Greeley’s northeast side, irony prevails as most of the neighborhoods around 
them are food deserts, meaning their residents lack equal access to full-service groceries (EPA et 
al., 2016). They are the focus of the third case, and within it is an example of policy diffusion 
where the mechanisms are being used to effectively move the system towards greater civil 
equality.  The USDA defines food deserts as low-income neighborhoods or communities that 
don’t have full-service grocers within a one-mile radius.  Food deserts in the US are also likely to 
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be majority Black and Latino and include neighborhoods that have been historically segregated, 
begging questions of racial equality.  Extensive research from the fields of public health to 
sociology has come to recognize the problem of food deserts as an issue of civil rights.  Concepts 
like ‘local food’ and ‘food sovereignty’ are at the fore of social movements and policy programs 
targeted at access to nutrition, also termed ‘food justice.’   One such program is a federal grant 
administered to local school districts by the USDA to improve the quality of school meals by 
signing contracts with local suppliers of fresh produce.  In theory, the program strengthens the 
local economy and provides an outlet for consistent, nutritionally dense food in places where 
there may not be much elsewhere (Christensen et al., 2017).  Policymaking in this last case 
instrumental for protecting civil rights when diffusion mechanisms are used appropriately. 
It would be inappropriate to make any conclusions about the struggle for civil rights in 
today’s food system without paying homage to its history, so, the chapter between the literature 
review and the case study is dedicated to doing that.  Current events and policies in the case 
study are shaped by the past as much as by the present, so a brief chapter on the civil rights 
history of agricultural labor is in order as much as a literature review of the policy diffusion 
framework.  Out of three historical junctures critical to the case study, the first two are 
considered to be the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) and the Bracero Program (1942-1963), 
which pushed and pulled, respectively, waves of annual migrant workers from Mexico to the US.  
The third critical juncture is the Chicano Movement (1950s-1970s), a civil rights campaign that 
ended the era of the Bracero Program and established a political movement for better working 
and living conditions. 
Finally, the history combined with the cases help to fill a gap in a popular variety of 
academic literature on the food system.  Academic conversations about inequality in food 
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processing are abundant, but how immigration fits that narrative is more difficult to come by 
(Colorado Food Summit, 2020).  For this reason, the historical background will focus on the 
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review   
 
Policy Diffusion Framework 
The policy diffusion framework is a robust method for investigating how, and why, 
governments and agencies implement the policies that they do.  Several in depth literature 
reviews of the policy diffusion framework have been written over time (Shipan and Volden, 
2008; Mintrom and Vergari, 1998; Berry, 1994; Berry and Berry, 1990; Walker 1969; Berry and 
Berry, 2018).1  This thesis relies most heavily on the works and interpretations of Berry and 
Berry’s unified model of policy diffusion because of its flexibility in terms of being applied to 
case studies. 
Policy is not created in a vacuum, rather most policies spread from one unit of 
government to others. “Unless the two governments arrived at the same (or very similar) policy 
via a highly improbable coincidence, at a minimum there must have been diffusion from one 
government to the other of the idea for the policy” (Berry and Berry, p. 265, 2018).  Adoption of 
a policy that preexists elsewhere is termed “policy innovation,” as opposed to policy invention. 
Policy diffusion literature draws from social network analysis, communication studies, 
and other diffusion models from fields like economics.  Diffusion of policy is a process where 
“innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social 
system” (Rogers, 1995; Berry and Berry, p. 253-54, 2018). These policy channels and networks 
can form vertically, say, between levels of agencies in a federal system; horizontally between 
agencies at the same level, or between different national governments; and they can form 
between public and private entities (Zhang and Zhu, 2016).   
 
1 Berry and Berry (2018) is Chapter 7 - “Innovation and Diffusion Models in Policy Research,” in: Weible and 
Sabatier (2018). “Theories of the Policy Process.” Fourth edition. Taylor and Francis, Westview Press.  
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Individuals and organizations advocating for policy change within these channels and 
networks are “policy entrepreneurs” (Berry and Berry, 256, 2018).  Mintrom (1997) 
characterizes them as those who “initiate dynamic policy change” by identifying policy 
problems, attracting policymakers, building coalitions and framing the terms of debate (Mintrom, 
p. 739, 1997).  Policy entrepreneurs are essential to the diffusion process because they are the 
ones most actively engaged in it.   
Models within the policy diffusion framework employ five mechanisms and motivations 
to make assumptions about what drives diffusion.  1) The learning mechanism assumes that 
“learning occurs when policymakers in one jurisdiction derive information about the 
effectiveness (or success) of a policy from previously adopting governments” (Levy, 1994; 
Braun and Gilardi, 2006; Berry and Berry, p. 256, 2018).  2) The imitation mechanism is simply 
the emulation of Jurisdiction B’s policies by Jurisdiction A “independently of any evaluation of 
the character of the policy or its effectiveness” (Simmons et al., 2006; Meseguer, 2006; Karch, 
2007; Berry and Berry, p. 257, 2019).  3) Normative pressure is a mechanism by which 
Jurisdiction A adopts a policy not as a function of learning or imitating, but because many other 
jurisdictions with similar values are adopting it (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Sugiyama, 2012, 
Berry and Berry, p. 257, 2018). 4) In a display of the Competition mechanism, usually to gain an 
economic advantage over Jurisdiction B, then Jurisdiction A will quickly adopt certain policies.  
5) Jurisdiction A may also be “Coerced into adopting a policy when a more powerful 
government” incentivizes, or mandates, it do so.  (Hoekstra, 2009; Hinkle, 2015; Berry and 
Berry, p. 259, 2018).  Common in the American federalist system are instances of vertical 
diffusion between local, state, and federal levels of government.  In such cases, the federal or 
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national government may use a “carrot” to incentivize policy adoption by sub-units, or it may use 
a “stick” to simply mandate policy adoption without question (Berry and Berry, p. 259, 2018).  
These five mechanisms are employed in the use of three “external” models2 including the 
“national interaction” model, the “regional diffusion” model, and the “leader-laggard” model.  
Each pivot mostly on the learning mechanism, especially the national interaction model.  It 
assumes that jurisdictions innovate by interacting with one another in settings like professional 
conferences and other, similar channels (Berry and Berry, p. 262, 2018).  Regional diffusion 
hypothesizes that neighboring jurisdictions, or those that share a region, are more likely to adopt 
the same policies because their geographic proximity accentuates mechanisms like learning, 
competition and imitation. Finally, the Leader-Laggard model suggests that for whatever reason, 
be it population or available resources, some jurisdictions are more innovative than others, and 
are quicker to adopt policies from elsewhere (Berry and Berry, 1990; Mintrom, 1997; Balla, 
2001; Berry and Berry, p. 263-64, 2018).     
“Internal” models emphasize political, economic, and social characteristics endogenous 
to the jurisdiction as the factors affecting its propensity to innovate (Berry and Berry, p. 254, 
265, 2018).  Many of these studies assume that larger governments and jurisdictions will have 
more capacity to innovate, as will those with more financial resources. Therefore, these are the 
jurisdictions that innovate the earliest and most frequently.  Others draw from organizational 
innovation literature, assuming that a jurisdiction’s behavior towards innovation is comparable to 
other types of organizations, and that their motivation to innovate is inversely related to the 
obstacles (Walker, 1969; Berry, 1994; Berry and Berry, p. 268, 2018).   
 
2 External models assume the causal mechanism for policy innovation are exogenous to the jurisdiction.  In other 
words, the motivation for adopting a policy is fed by outside influences.   
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The inverse relationship between internal motivations and obstacles is best portrayed as 
the interplay of “problem severity,” e.g., intensely poor economic conditions motivate policy 
action, with financial obstacles from a lack of monetary resources; following the example, 
because the economic conditions are so poor, policy innovation is unfeasible despite being in 
demand (Walker, 1969; Berry, 1994; Berry and Berry, p. 268, 2018).  
The Berry and Berry (1990) unified model tests for mechanisms both internal and 
external to the jurisdiction(s) adopting policy.  Before 1990, policy diffusion studies were 
severely limited by testing for either external or internal determinants, without considering them 
together.  Berry and Berry (1990) emphasized the flaws of studying them separately, and put 
forward the argument for a unified model.  Since then, the unified model has been employed in 
some notable, comparative studies, like testing for motivations and obstacles in the process of 
state lottery adoption (Berry and Berry, 1990); local, smoking policies (Shipan and Volden, 
2008); and state-level drinking and driving policies and enforcement (Hwang and Berry, 2019).  
These studies use different combinations of internal and external factors as independent 
variables, and measure for changes in the likelihood for policy diffusion.  They find a great 
degree of regional policy diffusion in state lottery adoption, the presence of most mechanisms in 
the transfer of local smoking policies, and that increased innovativeness led to more 
comprehensive traffic enforcement policies, respectively (Berry and Berry, 1990; Shipan and 
Volden, 2008; Hwang and Berry, 2019).   
Method 
While Berry and Berry’s unified, policy diffusion model is my primary method in this 
cross-case analysis of American food system policy, I also borrow lightly from the analytical 
toolbox of historical institutionalism by incorporating process tracing to identify critical 
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junctures and explain their relationship with the issues in the case.  Scholars have previously 
taken elements of historical institutionalism to amend policy diffusion studies.  They assert that 
policy adoptions are a function of history just as much as they are a product of diffusion from 
one unit of government to another (Kato, 2003; Beach, 2017).  Normally, a policy diffusion 
study includes a quantitative analysis of time series data, and often uses an “event history 
analysis,” (EHA).  Also referred to as a “risk” or “hazard” model, an EHA is a statistical 
regression used to predict the likelihood of a particular event occurring, or policy adopted, based 
on past data (Berry and Berry, p. 277, 2018).  Because this thesis is a qualitative use of the 
framework, then process tracing takes the place of what would be an EHA.  Without an EHA the 
findings cannot predict with statistical accuracy what hazards or risks are most likely to occur in 
the future of the food system.  But, a qualitative analysis of the past and present of the food 
system does reveal causal relationships and measures change over time, producing patterns that 
could be verified by future, statistical analysis.   
EHA’s and simply quantitative studies run the risk of ignoring crucial contexts and variables that 
a qualitative approach is more likely to capture.  An EHA predicts the likelihood of a certain 
policy being adopted based on past frequencies, but it can’t distinguish between what is and isn’t 
a civil rights violation or who is responsible, nor can it tell us why a given policy has a positive 
or negative outcome on civil equality (Jones and Baumgartner, p. 14, 2018).  The qualitative 
approach and the historical summary reinforce the findings of the case study by demonstrating 
how major events in the food system are related to the policy process and equal rights.   
After gathering volumes of primary and secondary sources with relevant content, I coded 
it for the presence of policy diffusion mechanisms and motivations.  Sources of information 
included mostly documents, newspapers, books, journals, videos, interviews, press releases, 
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government reports and databases, and general observations.  Used here are sources that made 
reference to the policies at the center of the cases, and those with information about agencies, 
organizations, individuals, events and other facts associated with the policies.  Criteria for the 
selection of the cases and the historic, critical junctures is based on their relevance to food 
system policy, their impact on equal rights, and their salience in politics and media.  Immigration 
and public health policy are two of, if not the, most important problems currently facing the food 
system (Colorado Food Summit, 2020). 
  Document and content analysis determine what events and policy adoptions demonstrate 
activation of one or more of the framework’s five mechanisms, learning, imitation, normative 
pressure, competition, and coercion.  Its motivations are also sought out: Problem severity, 
excess (or ‘slack’) capacity, and obstacles (to policy adoption).  I identify policy entrepreneurs 
and their roles in the policy process.  I am able to gauge the frequency of the mechanisms being 
used and how they relate to equality and civil rights.  This study will allow for similar research in 
the future with larger sample sizes and more empirical results.   
Northern Colorado, the geographical region featured in the history and the case study, is 
an especially valuable setting for this research.  Annually, Weld County is in the top-ten 
nationwide for agricultural production, so it is representative of agricultural regions across the 
US (Up-State Colorado, 2020).  Major media events concerning labor conditions at the JBS 
Swift Beef plant in Greeley over the past twenty years has made it a national arena for the most 
pressing debates over issues such as immigration policy, public health policy and racial equality 
and civil rights.  All of these factors combine to make this region a living laboratory and the 
perfect setting for this case study and its theoretical application.  The findings are an accurate 
barometer of the health of the nation’s food system. 
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Triangulating findings about the three cases with the policy diffusion framework and a 
history of labor in agriculture indicates that equality in the food system is suffering from civil 
rights violations that have handicapped it for more than a century.  Nonetheless, it also reveals 
that there is great potential in the policy process to mend injustice by empowering communities 
at the grassroots.  Patterns emerge in the types of mechanisms present, in the ways they are used, 
and in the impact they have on individuals and communities.   
Identifying the policy diffusion mechanisms in the case study tells us about the 
contemporary nature of the policymaking process.  But, to truly illustrate the causal forces that 
explain inequality stemming from food system related policy, an in-depth historical analysis is 
also necessary.  Kato (2003) argues that policy diffusion is driven by the past as much as by the 
present, and uses the term “lock-in” to reference a suboptimal and inelastic status quo that may, 
or may not, be changed by a series of policy diffusions.  “In historical lock-in, an inferior 
technology is diffused at the expense of a superior one… the outcome remains inefficient and 
irremediable” (Kato, p. 2003).  In other words, new technologies, or in this case policies, aren’t 
adopted despite being optimal.  The historical analysis and the case study trace the contest over, 
and diffusion of, policies that either sustain or erode inequality in the food system.  In this case, 
those policies that maintain inequality are clearly the suboptimal ones.  To expose examples of 
historical lock-in, institutionalized racism in the food system needs to be tied to certain critical 
junctures from the 20th century.  
According to Capoccia (2016), critical junctures are periods or events that disrupt 
longstanding institutions or norms to create new ones, and “have long term legacies.”  So, as the 
diffusion framework maps policy diffusions between government agencies, the process tracing 
illustrates the evolution of these policy problems from the 20th century to the 21st century.  
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Because historical institutionalism is often preoccupied with critical junctures to understand 
when, why and how institutions change, its analytical approaches like process tracing are 
especially helpful tools for explaining the evolution of food system policy.  The Oxford 
Handbook of Historical Institutionalism describes it as one method of using historical narratives 
“to identify the mechanisms that shaped political contestation over time” (Forietos et al., 2016).  
And, Beach (2017) echoes the value of process tracing specifically in the context of policy 
diffusion studies saying that, “process tracing methods and an emphasis on causal mechanisms 
have proven fruitful in advancing an understanding of both policy diffusion and social 
development” (Beach, p. 47, 2017).  Though the degree to which history decides the present and 
the future may not be apparent from first glance, patrons of historic institutionalism beg that we 
not take for granted the study of political history (Forietos et al., 2016; Capoccia, 2016).   
From roughly 1910 to 1920, the Mexican Revolution pushed millions to the US as they 
fled war and poverty, creating a lasting tradition of migrant labor.  The Bracero Program (1942-
1963) took advantage of that labor by formalizing the recruitment of migrants through an 
agreement with the Mexican government, again accelerating the migration patterns. Then, the 
Chicano Movement (1950s-1970s) emerged as the most formidable social movement in protest 
of the inhumane treatment of migrant workers by food growers participating in the Bracero 
Program.  These moments shaped the modern labor pool in food processing and entangled the 
issues of immigration and civil rights. The historical background acts as a foundation for the 
process tracing exercise before the diffusion framework is used to analyze the cases.  The 
policies and problems in the case study were not created overnight and the push for equal rights 
didn’t end with the Chicano Movement.   
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The policy adoptions and other events in the cases are products of historical lock-in, 
stemming from these 20th century critical junctures.  So called “push and pull” immigration 
factors in Mexico and the US like the Mexican Revolution and the Bracero Program set the US 
food system on a course defined by suboptimal welfare policies for immigrant farm workers in 
spite of their essential contributions.  A lack of provisions in the Bracero Program for working 
and living conditions coupled with racial segregation in the US severely restricted the access that 
migrant workers had to basic necessities and other social and economic opportunities.  But, the 
chance to work in the US was still preferable to many of these early migrants who were escaping 
years of violence and abject poverty in Mexico after the Mexican American War and the 
Mexican Revolution (Gutiérrez, p. 59, 2013).  This combination of events marks the beginning 
of a historical lock-in, in which the issues of immigration, public health, and civil rights collide 
in the food system. 
And yet, just because a policy or institution has the quality of being locked in as the 
status quo, that does not make it immune to change.  The policy diffusion process is often carried 
out in an attempt to replace suboptimal policies with more “appropriate” ones and break a course 
of historical lock-in.  Dolowitz (1997) says, “a primary cause of policy diffusion is 
dissatisfaction with the status quo” (Beach, p. 26, 2012).  Although this study emphasizes the 
longevity of inequality stemming from critical junctures in the 20th C. and sustained by more 
recent policies, it also seeks to highlight that institutionalized racism in the food system can be 
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Chapter 3 - Process Tracing, Critical Junctures and Historical Analysis 
 
History is essential to answering the research question by explaining how immigration, 
public health, and civil rights have come to overlap one another in the context of the food 
system.  This historical analysis narrates and traces three critical junctures from the 20th century 
to the present which have pushed and pulled migrant workers from Mexico to the US, creating 
traditional, word-of-mouth networks of immigrant laborers lasting into the 21st century.  They 
also set the US on a trajectory whereby US food growers and processors became reliant upon 
immigration policies that either provided authorized migrant workers, or which do not enforce 
against the hiring and exploitation of unauthorized workers.  Organized resistance to the 
mistreatment of agricultural labor and racial segregation has confronted such injustice since the 
1950s in the form of the Chicano Movement and the United Farm Workers Union (UFW). 
Much recent scholarship on inequality in food processing has posited that exploitive 
working and living conditions are results of the US supply chain model being globalized through 
free trade agreements in the late 20th century (Shiva, 2016; Carolan; 2013).  They largely ignore 
that inequality within America’s domestic food system is the product of a much longer and even 
more turbulent history of civil rights abuses among migrant workers.  This scholarship devoted 
to the topic of inequality in the global food system has become prominent despite 
misrepresenting historic events and causal mechanisms.  The literature does accurately take a 
global view of the issue, and is correct in asserting that the American, industrialized system of 
agriculture became a model adopted internationally during the so-called Green Revolution of the 
1950s and 1960s (Shiva, 2016; Carolan, 2013).  Inequality worldwide, they say, is a result of 
globalizing American-styled food processing (Shiva, 2016).  But, by narrowly considering only 
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how the American system has been modeled and abused in Mexico, India, Latin America, Asia, 
and Africa, those studies fail to consider what is, and has been, driving inequality within the 
American system domestically.  By taking a second look at history we find that the export of 
American agriculture worldwide would’ve been inconceivable without the continued import of 
immigrant labor to the US, and this reality has significant and enduring implications for equality.  
In contrast, this historical analysis summarizes the actual key events and policies 
responsible for structural inequality in the food system today.  The original factors pushing and 
pulling immigrants to work in the US, such as the Mexican Revolution and the Bracero Program, 
explain how by 1950 the Americana food system was sustained by informal networks and 
immigration policies that tolerated exploitative working and living conditions that deeply 
embedded lasting inequality within immigrant communities.  Then, the case study brings us to 
the 21st century with a careful and up-close look at how the policy process has been instrumental 
in either protecting or violating the rights of the food system’s immigrant laborers over the past 
twenty years, giving a comparative view of how much they have, or have not, improved since the 
20th century.   
Shiva (2016) and Carolan (2013) point a finger at the 1994 North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) for unsettling the Mexican maize sector and driving millions of rural 
Mexican residents into cities and the US looking for work and a new life, predominantly in 
agriculture (Shiva, p.100, 2016).  However, the vast majority of Mexican immigration to the US 
occurred between 1970 and 2010.  In 2010, the rate of Mexican immigration to the US was 
overtaken by the rate of individuals returning to Mexico from the US.3  If NAFTA led to such a 
 
3 Migration Policy Institute. Migration rates between US and Mexico since 1870. 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/mexican-born-population-over-
time?width=1000&height=850&iframe=true. 
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wave of migration, then the mechanism by which it displaced people was likely neutralized by 
2010, and whatever caused Mexican immigration to the US to spike in the 1970s predates any 
liberal reforms of the 1990s. 
NAFTA was not the original impetus for the mass migration of Mexican labor to the U.S. 
Rather, the original cause goes back much further.  The Mexican-American War (1846-1848) 
and the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) uprooted millions and, in the late 1800s, waves of 
Mexican nationals were migrating to the US to work on railroads, in mines, and on farms 
(Deutsch, 1987).  In 1943, the US and Mexico formally agreed to the Bracero Program; its terms 
granted US work visas to a set number of Mexican nationals to participate in agricultural labor.  
Producers in the US were facing labor shortages caused by World War II, and Mexico stood to 
gain from remittances.  Both economies benefitted from the economic partnership (Bracero 
History Archive, 2019).   Even before the Bracero Program, Mexican migrants traveled from 
farm to farm in the U.S. in constant search of labor beginning at the turn of the twentieth century.   
The Bracero Program, also referred to as Public Law 78 (1951), institutionalized what 
was an informal practice of recruiting farm labor from Mexico from the early 1900s (Kim, 
2017).  Even after its repeal in 1963, it had locked American immigration policy into a 
relationship with issues of agricultural labor.  Immigration laws were, thereafter, largely 
determined by the needs of growers and processors.  Recruiting of Hispanic and Mexican labor 
to work the fields had begun in northern Colorado in 1916.  It was the catalyst of most of the 
immigration to come, and the beginning of institutional norms that were uninterrupted until the 
early 2000s.   
Through the twentieth century, tens of thousands of Mexican and Hispanic families 
migrated annually to the northern Colorado region to plant, tend, and harvest the sugar beet 
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fields on behalf of farmers holding contracts with Great Western Sugar factories.4  Often 
forbidden from living and shopping within city limits by segregation laws and codes, migrants 
lived in tents and shacks while building adobe homes in “Spanish Colonies” near the fields.  
Multiple families occupied one room adobes with little else but a wood stove and a dirt floor 
(Brooks, 2002).  Since the Bracero Program especially, US immigration policy has been crafted 
with special consideration for the labor needs of domestic food growers and processors, but not 
necessarily for the laborers themselves.  The unequal nature of this relationship derived from the 
Bracero Program persists today, evidenced by Covid-19 outbreaks and food deserts that 
disproportionately affect immigrant communities.  Like historical artifacts, these are tangible 
remnants of de jure segregation.  But this history has also been marked by formidable 
challengers of the status quo like the United Farm Workers (UFW), the Chicano Movement, 
Cesar Chavez and Dolores Huerta among many others.   
Driven by political disenfranchisement and miserable working and living conditions in 
California’s fields, Hispanic and immigrant laborers began organizing politically in the 1950s 
and mobilized campaigns to consolidate power in the policymaking process (Solis, 2019).  Like 
the Covid-19 outbreaks and food deserts we see in today’s food system, agricultural workers and 
their families in the 20th century were highly susceptible to dysentery and other severe illness.  
They were also discouraged from voting and organizing politically.  Local activist and Greeley, 
Colorado school board member Rhonda Solis interviewed founding co-leader of the Chicano 
Movement and the United Farm Workers (UFW), Dolores Huerta, about her experiences in a 
 
4 Great Western Sugar, founded in 1900 by Charles Boettcher, pioneered industrialized sugar processing in northern 
Colorado and the Great Plains region.  Sugar processing plants dotted the region, dominated local economies, and 
demanded the labor of thousands of migrant, Hispanic planters and harvesters in sugar beet fields until the early 
2000s. Great Western Sugar’s practice of recruiting Mexican migrant labor set a precedent for the Bracero Program.  
Western Sugar Cooperative. 2018. History-Great Western Sugar.  https://www.westernsugar.com/who-we-
are/history/ 
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podcast.  Huerta emphasized that influencing politics and policy change through grassroots 
organizing was atop the movement’s agenda.  Huerta said, “Anytime that we want to change 
policies, we have to get the people affected involved and we have to get them engaged” (Solis, 
2019).  She credited their mobilization with the erasure of Public Law 78, the Bracero Program, 
in 1963 (Solis, 2019).  The end of the Bracero Program roughly indicates the beginning of the 
Chicano Movement, the third critical juncture.  Although exploitive labor practices persisted, the 
movement’s success in ending the Bracero Program shocked the system and gave generations of 
activists to come confidence to fight exploitive conditions and policies (Kim, 2017).   
In spite of immigration policies being deliberately tailored to labor demands, and even amidst the 
modern work visa system, food processors have frequently turned to “undocumented” sources of 
foreign labor to cut costs and fill labor shortages.  The Bracero Program had the “effect of 
increasing both sanctioned and unsanctioned migration to the US from Mexico.  By reinforcing 
communication networks between contract workers and their friends and families in their places 
of origin in Mexico, increasing numbers of Mexicans were able to gain reliable knowledge about 
labor market conditions, employment opportunities, and migration routes” (Gutiérrez, p. 59, 
2013).  The end of the Bracero Program was not the end of the relationship between farmers and 
foreign national workers.   
Because undocumented immigrants lack citizenship or residency status and are not 
authorized to work in the US, they are not guaranteed any of the usual protections or benefits 
from employers.  This encourages employers to undermine and disregard union demands.  The 
practice of hiring undocumented labor is widespread across the food system and many other 
sectors (Patmore and Stromquist, 2018).  Regardless of citizenship status, immigrant workers 
have always been the backbone of the food system. 
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Figure 1 An adobe home from Greeley's Spanish Colony at the Centennial Village Museum (Brooks, 2002).  
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Figure 2 A family harvests the sugar beet fields outside of Greeley, CO. Circa 1920. (Brooks, 2002). 
 
The development of the heavily industrialized, American food system since the second half of 
the 19th century would have never been possible were it not for the waves of immigrants from 
Asia, Europe and Latin America.  Labor and immigration policy have grown together through 
decades of policies that regulate flows of immigrants according to farm labor needs.  When 
immigration policy became slow to adapt to the needs of immigrants and farmers alike, then 
undocumented immigration filled the role of the early migrants.     
Undocumented labor in food and agriculture was lessened in the early 2000s when the 
Department of Homeland Security created a new program called Secure Communities to crack 
down on undocumented labor in food processing facilities, and since then refugees from 
Somalia, Kenya, and Myanmar have been increasingly recruited to work in them.  Still, Latin 
American immigrants represent the bulk of the food processing labor force in the US (Kammer, 
2009).  Even after large meat processors shifted their dependence from undocumented workers to 
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refugees, and after organized labor movements, the legacy of inequality from the Bracero 
Program and systemic racism lingers today.  Neighborhoods that have historically been home to 
Latino agricultural workers are strained by inconsistent, unequal access to food, which is 
formally recognized by the US Department of Agriculture as an affront to civil rights (Gallagher, 
2019). It’s no coincidence that deadly Covid-19 outbreaks have stricken the same demographics 
that suffered from the Bracero Program’s exploitations the most.  Low wages and limited 
benefits have been compounded by decades of de jure and de facto segregation, creating lasting, 
structural inequality in these communities.  This brings us to the case study, which begins with a 
summary of how immigration policy in the 21st century has created new challenges to immigrant 
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Chapter 4 - Case Study 
 
 
Case 1:  Secure Communities Immigration Policy  
When the UFW successfully ended the Bracero Program in 1963, a vacuum was left in that area 
of immigration policy.  Agricultural employers returned to informal, word-of-mouth networks to 
recruit undocumented, migrant workers from Mexico (Gutiérrez, p. 59, 2013).  This was 
complemented by the lax enforcement of immigration laws by government agencies which 
sustained a low-cost labor pool until 2001.  The September 11th terrorist attacks were a major, 
critical juncture affecting that policy norm when it inspired the creation of agencies like the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and 
a stricter enforcement policy targeted at the deportation of undocumented workers, called Secure 
Communities.  The 9/11 attacks were incorporated into political rhetoric that was used as 
leverage in the creation of these new agencies, but was also responsible for “blurring the line” 
between immigrants, undocumented immigrants, and terrorists, creating a “nativist backlash,” 
according to Romero (2006).  This first case uses policy diffusion to explain the moment when 
undocumented labor went from being an economic norm to an issue of national security. 
In 2006, ICE targeted undocumented workers in the meatpacking sector and staged the 
largest workplace raid in the history of the US at beef plants in Greeley, CO and across the US.  
Although there was a measurable decrease in unauthorized labor afterward, Secure Communities 
was suspended by the DHS in 2014 because it had become a civil rights liability and many units 
of government quit participating (AP Wire, 2014).  Even as exploitive an institution as 
undocumented labor is, Secure Communities was as much a threat to civil rights because it was 
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found out to have encouraged racial profiling, the arrest and deportation of low-level offenders 
(e.g., traffic tickets), and the separation of families.  
First, it is important to recall some principles of policy diffusion from the literature review in 
Chapter Two.  The diffusion mechanisms of learning and coercion are identified the most 
frequently in the cases.  Coercion is expressed in the form of top-down mandates from the 
federal government to which localities and states had to respond.  As Berry and Berry (2018) 
assert, mandates are a common vehicle for coercive policy diffusion.  To achieve diffusion by 
coercion, “the national government can simply mandate certain activities by states … or the 
Supreme Court can make rulings that constrain state policy choices (Hoekstra 2009: Hinkle 
2015)” (P.259).  And, lastly, current literature on the competition mechanism refers mostly to 
instances of economic competition between cities and states, arguing that jurisdictions will 
compete to adopt policies that give them some sort of economic edge over a neighboring, rival 
jurisdiction.  The policy diffusion literature uses the competition mechanism strictly in reference 
to the economic arms race between jurisdictions that neighbor each other geographically, and it 
does not consider competition as something that may occur between units of government with 
non-geographic jurisdictions (Berry and Berry, p. 259, 2018; Gilardi and Wasserfallen, 2017).  
But, impasses over policy between agencies not based on geography do occur, as bared in this 
case study.   
In the course of this first case, an initial series of policy adoptions diffuse from the top 
down as the Department of Homeland Security coerced state and local agencies to create 
protocol that fit the mandates of its Secure Communities policy.  Specifically, it demanded that 
state and local law enforcement make it their own policy to report any undocumented immigrants 
whom they contacted.  Some agencies took well to the policy, but others eventually contested it 
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by declining to enforce it.  After lower-level agencies and courts began rejecting it, the DHS 
revised Secure Communities in 2014, renaming it the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP), and 
repurposed it to focus deportation efforts strictly on individuals with violent and other felony, 
criminal convictions5.  After allowing and even encouraging reliance on immigrant farm labor 
(documented or not) for decades, the federal government rejected this precedent after the 
September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center (Chishti and Bergeron, 2011).  ICE says the 
Secure Communities enforcement policy was implemented in 2008,6 but its mandates and 
programs were actually being rolled out as early as 2002 when the Department of Homeland 
Security was created (Aldana, 2008).   
The post 9/11 approach to immigration policy also criminalized undocumented 
immigration, whereas before it had been treated as a civil offense.  In United States Vs. 
Martinez-Fuerte (1976) the US Supreme Court considered the Fourth amendment (prohibiting 
unreasonable search and seizure) in cases involving immigration.  One “explanation for this 
Fourth amendment exceptionalism is the court’s early treatment of immigration as a civil as 
opposed to criminal enforcement” said a contributor to University California Davis Law Review 
(Aldana, p. 1091, 2008).  The aggressive Secure Communities enforcement style was an overt 
denial of the precedent set by US V. Martinez-Fuerte and a 180° turn from the previous century’s 
paradigm.  “Since 2002, DHS has made inside-the-border enforcement of immigration a priority, 
particularly targeting undocumented workers,” (Aldana, p. 1084, 2008).  In 2006, Operation 
Wagon Train commenced as the largest workplace raid in US history, targeted food processing 
facilities including the Swift and Co. Beef plant in Greeley, CO (Kammer, 2009).   
 
5 Ibid. 
6 ICE. Overview – Secure Communities. https://www.ice.gov/secure-communities#a1 
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Operation Wagon Train was a militaristic raid conducted by ICE, and caused irreparable 
damage to immigrant communities and the civil rights of workers, striking another blow to 
equality in the food system. The raid revealed a double standard in Secure Communities’ 
enforcement strategy.  The press release stated that the only targets of the raid were 
undocumented immigrants who had stolen social security numbers from citizens to get jobs in 
the US.  Arrested and detained were 1,297 immigrants on “administrative” (non-criminal) 
charges, and 274 on criminal charges.  Among them were natural born US citizens.   It is also 
been reported that Swift and Co. wittingly and regularly hired undocumented immigrants.  
Nevertheless, none of Swift’s management level staff was criminally charged for fraudulent 
hiring practices (Kammer, 2009).   
The practice of hiring undocumented labor in the Greeley meatpacking facility goes back 
in time well beyond 2006.  Undocumented labor allowed successive owners of the facility to 
skirt union demands and save on labor costs.  According to Steve Mize, a longtime grocery store 
owner in Greeley, “It’s really just accepted, the immigrant workers and the illegal immigrants. 
And why? Because they are needed.  We know it exists; it’s just an ignored factor. It’s not an 
argument; it just is.”  The 2006 raid “brought attention to a culture in Greeley where illegal 
immigrants are accepted, and depended on” (Aguilera and Griffin, 2016).  Figure 3 illustrates 
what precipitated the shift to undocumented labor made by employers in the area.  The 
meatpacking plant’s dependence on undocumented immigrants grew exponentially when the 
Local No. 641 led strikes in 1979 for better wages and forced the original owners of the plant to 
close in 1980.  In order to reopen, the owners turned to undocumented labor, quelling the union 
demands by replacing their members with migrant, Latin American workers who were not in a 
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position to bargain because of language barriers and the transient nature of migrant work 
(Patmore and Stromquist, 2018). 
 
Figure 3 Aguilera, Elizabeth and Greg Griffin. 5/7/2016. “Weld’s Secret Broke Open.” Denver Post. This sequence of events 
demonstrates a shift to undocumented labor at the Monfort meat plant in the 1980s as a way to circumvent demands for better 
pay.   
 
Monfort and the industry at large sustained profit margins by undermining unions, safety 
regulations and increased wages through the hiring of undocumented workers who had little to 
no bargaining power.  In Monfort’s case, ownership resisted the union demands not just to 
maintain profit margins but because it simply could not afford to raise wages.  After the strike, 
the plant relied on undocumented workers just to meet their operating costs and stay open.  The 
statement below from the Great Plains Encyclopedia acts as corroborating evidence for the fact 
that the strikes at Monfort in the late 1970s and early 1980s forced the closure of the plant and 
was only able to reopen with undocumented labor: 
"November 1979: Wages are again in dispute as 900 strikers from 
United Food and Commercial Workers Local No. 641 walk off the job at 
the meatpacking plant, setting off similar strikes at other Colorado 
plants. After 73 days, the employees return to work without a 
contract.
March 1980: Monfort closes its Greeley meatpacking plant because of 
acute operating losses and serious conflicts with unionized workers.
March 1987: Monfort and his sons Dick and Charlie sell the Greeley 
feedlots and processing plants to Omaha-based ConAgra Inc."
March 1982: Despite continuing labor and wage disputes, Monfort 
reopens its Greeley meatpacking plant.
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“Exploitation of Mexican and Mexican American meatpacking workers was not limited to 
Nebraska.  In Greeley, Colorado, similar conditions existed. Following the temporary shutdown 
of a Monfort meatpacking plant there in 1980, the local meatpackers’ union disbanded, giving 
Monfort a free hand in its treatment of the new workers the company hired when it reopened in 
1982.  Monfort started by filling its factories with Mexican and Central and South American 
workers.  Working conditions were no better than at the meatpacking plants in Nebraska, and 
Greeley city officials were reluctant to take action against Monfort’s exploitation of its workers 
because the local economy relied heavily on the meatpacking industry” (Wishart, 2011). 
 
After the plant reopened in 1982 and was sold in 1987, undocumented labor became more and 
more prevalent until 2006.  It was reported that at the time of the 2006 raid, 23% of Swift & 
Co.’s workforce was undocumented.  All workers in the plant, regardless of legal status, were 
earning 45% less in wages than they were in 1980 (Kammer, 2009). 
Local officials were reluctant to intervene (at least publicly) in part because immigration 
is a federal policy issue, but also because of the local economy’s dependence on undocumented 
labor.  Another reason they hesitated to address the immigration issue was due to how politically 
contentious it was.  Soon after the 2006 ICE raid at the Greeley Swift & Co. facility, the city’s 
then mayor Tom Selders testified to Congress in Washington D.C. about the fallout from the 
raid, and vehemently opposed its methods.  Selders said in his testimony that Secure 
Communities was “a failed federal policy.  We can’t deport 12 million people. There’s not the 
political will.  In Colorado, what would that do to our tourist industry? What would that do to our 
agriculture?” (Olinger, 2008).  Selders had won 65% of the vote as a Republican in 2005.  After 
denouncing the raid to Congress, he received only 39% of the vote in the next election.  
Opponents lambasted him as being weak-on-crime and he lost to a candidate with a tough-on-
immigrants platform (Olinger, 2008).  The nativist backlash caused by 9/11 and the creation of 
Secure Communities had successfully reframed undocumented immigration from an economic 
issue to one of national security, religion, and race (Romero, 2006).  
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After 2006, DHS and ICE used coercion as a mechanism to diffuse the Secure 
Communities policy to local agencies.  Some law enforcement agencies embraced the policy 
while others were more reluctant.  In Greeley, the Weld County, CO Sheriff and District 
Attorney’s office enthusiastically implemented Secure Communities in 2008.  As a result, 
“Operation Numbers Game” was a local campaign that very closely imitated ICE’s 2006 
Operation Wagon Train.  On October 17, 2008 the county sheriff raided Amalia’s Tax and 
Translation Services in Greeley and confiscated the tax records of over 1,300 suspected 
undocumented immigrants (Frosch, 2009).  Just as ICE had claimed about Operation Wagon 
Train in 2006, Weld DA Ken Buck insisted that Operation Numbers Game was not about 
immigration, but rather identity theft.  Investigators interrogated the business owner, Amalia 
Cerillo, and indicted around 100 of her clients on charges of buying stolen social security 
numbers in order to work and file taxes in the US.  Others whose records were seized had 
obtained Individual Taxpayer Identification Numbers (ITINs) from the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) in order to file taxes in lieu of a social security number.  Despite filing taxes legally, the 
raid subjected them to unreasonable search and seizure, and deportation (Frosch, 2009).  
Immigration raids at the meat plant and at Amalia’s demonstrate the diffusion of Secure 
Communities from the federal to the local level via mechanisms of coercion and imitation.    
But by December 2009 the implementation of Secure Communities began to unravel 
when the Colorado State Supreme Court upheld a ruling from Weld District Judge James 
Hartmann that the tax records were seized illegally by the district attorney.  The Supreme Court 
wrote that the DA had failed to establish probable cause of identity theft, and had violated the 
Fourth amendment rights of the record holders, considering tax records are confidential (Whaley, 
2009).  The decision marked a return to the precedent set in US V Martinez-Fuerte (1976) in its 
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consideration of the Fourth amendment in immigration related cases, and started a second stream 
of policy diffusion. 
DHS’s and ICE’s use of the coercive mechanism7 mandating compliance/adoption of 
Secure Communities at lower levels of government, such as police departments, backfired.  After 
the Colorado court ruling on Operation Numbers Game, law enforcement agencies in several 
states,discontinued compliance with Secure Communities.  During the Supreme Court trial, the 
Denver Post reported that, “prosecutors around the country have been watching the [Numbers 
Game] case closely, reportedly the first in the United States in which law enforcement sought to 
use tax returns — generally considered confidential under federal law — to take suspected illegal 
immigrants to criminal court” (Whaley, 2009).  State and local law enforcement agencies across 
the country had lost faith in Secure Communities by this point and were looking for ways out, so 
Colorado’s ruling on Operation Numbers Game gave them an escape route by reinforcing the 
previous precedent that had been set by US V. Martinez-Fuerte 1976 (Whaley, 2009). 
States and localities competed with DHS to replace Secure Communities.  As more 
agencies in states like Colorado, California and Pennsylvania abandoned Secure Communities, 
the DHS suspended the policy in 2014, and replaced it with the Priority Enforcement Program 
(PEP), which was supposed to be less invasive of immigrant communities by only targeting 
undocumented individuals who were wanted for violent and other serious crimes for deportation.  
It was also less demanding of state and local law enforcement, cancelling the mandate that they 
report undocumented individuals in their custody to ICE (AP Wire, 2014).  
The early 2000s were a watershed moment for labor in the food system.  Upon the 
creation of the DHS, ICE, and Secure Communities the federal government had gone from 
 
7 As policy diffusion framework would refer to them. 
 32  
overlooking undocumented labor, to mandating law enforcement agencies to report any and all 
undocumented immigrants they came in contact with.  All of those on the receiving end of this 
paradigm shift, from workers and families to plant management, police departments, judicial 
courts, and policymakers, were unsettled and forced to adapt (Kammer, 2009).   
The highly coercive, invasive, and militarized nature of Secure Communities and 
Operation Numbers Game eroded trust and drove wedges between law enforcement and 
immigrant communities.  Some of Greeley’s Latino and immigrant residents are still dealing 
with the trauma left by the raids.  “The way people have dealt with this is to not talk about it,” 
said Priscilla Falcón, a professor of Latino studies at the University of Northern Colorado. “The 
issue is still pretty raw. It’s still an open wound. We live in a divided community” (Lofholm, 
2013).  The methods and mechanisms for enforcing Secure Communities are responsible for civil 
rights abuses and social and cultural damage, providing insight into why it was such a failed 
policy.   
Secure Communities’ offshoots like Operation Wagon Train and Operation Numbers 
Game violated civil rights in at least two instances.  Individuals whose tax records were seized at 
Amalia’s were denied protection from unreasonable search and seizure, as were hundreds of 
verified US residents detained during the 2006 Swift & Co. raid.  By the DHS’ own admission, 
the policy enabled racial discrimination and civil rights violations which it used as justification 
for suspending Secure Communities (DHS, 2011).  That recognition is proof of the learning 
mechanism being activated as a federal agency learned from policy adoptions being made at state 
and local levels that rejected Secure Communities and made a corresponding policy adoption 
itself through the Priority Enforcement Program. 
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Diffusion of Secure Communities may have ended a longstanding policy paradigm 
tolerant of unauthorized labor, but it did not improve working conditions, nor did it really change 
the course of the unequal, historical lock-in.  By 2008, Greeley based Swift & Co. had been 
acquired by Brazilian meatpacker JBS, who then established the American subsidiary JBS USA 
and headquartered it in Greeley.8  Afterwards, they and their industry peers began to hire 
sanctioned, refugee workers from Somalia, Kenya, and Myanmar, reducing their reliance on 
undocumented Latin Americans and rapidly changing the demographics of the labor pool 
(Kammer, 2009).  According to the Los Angeles Times, the Greeley Beef plant raised wages and 
hired dozens of US citizens and African refugees immediately after the 2006 raid.  Industry 
wide, they say, the portion of undocumented immigrants in the meatpacking workforce dropped 
from 52% in 2006 to 42% by 2008 (Groves and Tareen, 2020).  Dependence on foreign labor 
persisted as much as before, but a lack of residency/citizenship status among workers was no 
longer the primary mechanism for exploitation.   
Case 2:  Policy Diffusion and Covid-19 in Meatpacking 
Recent events in food processing like Covid-19 outbreaks show that just because large 
employers broke from the decades long practice of exploiting undocumented workers, the health 
and safety of working conditions did not necessarily improve.  With tens of thousands of 
meatpacking employees having been infected nationwide, and hundreds more dead from Covid-
19 in just one year, concerns about civil rights violations are being raised (Clyburn, 2021).  
Illustrated in this case is how new policy was diffused to respond to some of the nation’s worst 
Covid-19 outbreaks threatening food supply chains.   
 
8 JBS. 2020. About JBS: History. https://jbssa.com/about/history/ 
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Disproportionate numbers of infections and deaths among workers of color at the JBS 
Greeley meatpacking plant in northern Colorado has signaled to Congress and other NGOs a 
potential case of civil rights infractions (Newell and Sinclair, 7/2020).  JBS USA and other 
meatpackers like Smithfield have shouldered most of the blame for civil rights violations related 
to Covid-19 spread in their plants.  But this analysis of the policymaking process in response to 
the outbreaks, using the diffusion framework, suggests that several government entities are just 
as culpable.  In the government’s response to Covid-19 outbreaks at food processing facilities, an 
initial stream of policy adoptions between Weld County and the State of Colorado meant to slow 
meat production and the spread of the virus collided with, and was overwhelmed by, a second 
stream or series of opposing policy adoptions designed by the White House and the CDC meant 
to keep the facilities operating at full capacity.   
JBS’s Greeley facility was the first Covid-19 outbreak at a meat plant to get national 
media and political attention, so it was the catalyst for much of the policy diffusion nationwide 
(Maddow, 5/1/2020).  The JBS facility was regarded essential to national security and remained 
open.  At first, local, state, and union officials were generally reluctant to close the plant.  The 
JBS Greeley site is one of the nation’s largest meatpacking plants, and more than 3,400 workers 
depend on it for income.  “Shutting down one plant, even for a few weeks, is like closing an 
airport hub. It backs up hog and beef production across the country, crushes prices paid to 
farmers and eventually leads to months of meat shortages” (Corkery and Yaffe-Bellany, 2020). 
But, after the second death of a union member from Covid-19, United Food and Commercial 
Workers (UFCW) #7 President Kim Cordova demanded that the plant be closed for a minimum 
of one week.  An April 10 letter to the governor requested action on the part of the state to 
contain the outbreak by using its authority to close the plant and deep clean it, provide testing 
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and paid leave for all employees, and healthcare for infected/potentially infected workers before 
the plant’s reopening. The State of Colorado subsequently met most of the union demands the 
same day via a CDPHE order (Cordova, 2020).   
In so doing, CDPHE was adopting the policy recommendations of an April 4 order issued 
to the JBS facility by the WCDPHE.  The county’s initial order was based on findings of an 
investigation from a week prior to survey safety conditions after numerous employees tested 
positive for Covid-19 and nearly 1000 union members walked off the job demanding more safety 
precautions (Bunge, 2020)9.  The April 4 order mandated several precautions on behalf of worker 
safety including plexiglass between workspaces, personal protective equipment, distancing, and 
paid sick leave (Navarro, 2020). 
After the CDPHE order was issued, JBS announced April 10 (5:45pm) that it agreed to 
close the Greeley facility over the Easter holiday, through the following Tuesday, to clean the 
plant and test all employees10.  This initial outcome was the result of a bottom-up, policy 
diffusion process, wherein the CDPHE adopted the WCDPHE’s policy response to the Covid-19 
outbreak at JBS.  This policy adoption was done in the spirit of collaboration, or learning, to use 
the language of the diffusion literature.  It was also meant to ensure the compliance of JBS by 
reinforcing the county’s authority to regulate conditions in the plant.  Still, JBS was able to avoid 
fully complying with the regulations, due in part to the federal government’s response.      
Five hours earlier the plant had been thrust into the national spotlight when President 
Trump made reference to it in the daily White House briefing (2:25pm) on the pandemic.  This 
 
9 Workers, families and the local union are alleging a lack of preparedness and failure to cooperate on the part of 
JBS in response to the outbreak.  Some employees and family speaking out are concealing their identities for fear of 
retaliation by management.  Bunge, Jacob. 4/6/2020. “Coronavirus Hits Meat Plants as Some Workers Get Sick, 
others Stay at Home.” Wall Street Journal.  
10 JBS USA. 4/10/2020. “JBS USA Partners with White House, Governor Polis and Senator Gardner to Provide Free 
Covid-19 Tests for Greeley Beef Team Members.” Press Release. https://jbssa.com/about/news/2020/04-
10/#.Xpny1S3MyGR 
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marked the beginning of an opposing effort to keep meat plants at full capacity.  After being 
asked by a journalist if there was any “priority to get testing at food processing plants all across 
the country,” the president alluded to the situation at JBS and implied that a policy of mass 
Covid-19 testing would be undertaken in the case of an outbreak, like at JBS, but gave no 
specifics about a nationwide policy to test workers.  The president said: 
“You’re asking that because of what happened in Denver, because in Denver I’ve 
never seen – I said what’s going on? You’ve got this one spike… this just 
happened I just saw it this morning…I think we’re doing well… they’ve got it 
under control.  But yeah that’d be a case where you’d do some very big testing.”11 
 
President Trump never specified exactly who or what he was referring to when he said “they” 
have “it” under control.  Nonetheless the national media quickly deciphered the “Denver” 
incident as the Covid-19 outbreak at the Greeley JBS facility.  Despite promising that a policy to 
do mass testing at food processing facilities was already in place, local news reported that the 
plan to test all employees was abruptly cancelled on April 12, Easter Sunday, as it quickly turned 
into a logistical nightmare (Bradbury, 2020).   
After the state mandated that the plant close, be cleaned, and its workers tested, that 
initial set of policy adoptions began to face resistance from federal agencies like the CDC and 
from the White House.  Federal agencies eroded the initial policy adoptions that were diffused 
from the WCDPHE to the CDPHE and, likely, other states.  First, the CDC coerced the CDPHE 
and the WCDPHE into relaxing their guidelines for asymptomatic workers by threatening to 
withhold federal assistance.   The day after the April 10 order, in an email exchange between 
CDPHE director Jill Ryan and WCDPHE director Mark Wallace, Ryan informed Wallace that 
she had been asked by CDC director Robert Redfield to relax the mandates in its order, 
 
11 White House. 4/10/2020. “President Trump discusses learning about the COVID-19 outbreak at JBS meatpacking 
plant.” YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RSLCStmAxa4   
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specifically to allow exposed but asymptomatic individuals to continue working.  Ryan asked 
Wallace if he “was okay with that.”  Ryan told Wallace that the CDC had implied it would 
cutback Covid-19 assistance to Colorado if they did not appease the request, which they both did 
(Fendt, 2020).   
On April 24, Weld County allowed the JBS plant to reopen without completing 
implementation of the state’s mandates, and against the advice of its own director of public 
health, Dr. Wallace, whom retired immediately thereafter (Daly, 5/22/2020).  Despite the fact 
that the April 10 order mandated that JBS work with the Colorado Department of Labor to 
distribute benefit assistance to impacted employees, Reuters reported that JBS USA was denying 
worker compensation claims for those who fell ill from Covid-19, and for those who died.  A 
response written by JBS to a compensation claim from the family of Saul Sanchez, the first JBS 
employee in Greeley to die of Covid-19, simply said his death was “not work related,” and did 
not elaborate any further (Hals and Polansek, 9/29/2020).  It’s also being alleged in two, signed 
affidavits from medical contractors hired by JBS to conduct testing that workers were charged 
$100 per test and that even those who displayed symptoms were encouraged by management to 
go to work without being tested (Meade, 10/6/2020).  Clearly, the April 10 order from the State 
of Colorado did not carry weight with JBS USA management. 
Four days after Weld County reversed course on its closure mandate, President Trump 
activated the Defense Production Act, nationalizing all beef and poultry facilities, a decision that 
disallowed state and local agencies from shutting down meat processors with Covid-19 outbreaks 
and satisfied the demands of the meatpacking lobby (Grabell and Yeung, 9/14/2020).  A copy of 
the executive order from the White House justified the decision by saying that the closure of 
meat plants was “inconsistent” with the policies of the CDC, the Occupational Safety and Hazard 
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Administration (OSHA), and the Department of Labor.  “Such closures,” it said, “threaten the 
continued functioning of the national meat and poultry supply chain, undermining critical 
infrastructure during the national emergency” (White House, 4/2020).  However, the order 
makes no reference to the threats posed by outbreaks to the health of the essential workers 
staffing the plants.   
What defines the second series of policy adoptions the most is the oversized role that the 
meatpacking lobby played in the diffusion process by having a monopoly on the flow of 
information, excluding other stakeholders and opinions from consideration.  Rather than acting 
as arbiters of the policy contest, federal officials and agencies heavily favored the interest of the 
meatpacking lobby.  FOIA requests filed by ProPublica for relevant correspondence between the 
two parties confirms the federal government’s deference to the industry in its decision making.  
Former OSHA investigator Debbie Berkowitz said to USA Today that “the [meatpacking] 
industry ran to the White House,” and demanded to “stay open and have USDA intimidate [state 
and local] health departments” (Chadde et al., 9/15/2020).  On top of the intimidating coercion 
pressed against local and state health officials, the federal government made policy adoptions 
that were carbon copies of language sent to them by the meatpacking lobby, in particular 
Trump’s issuing of the Defense Production Act nationalizing meatpackers (Grabell and Yeung, 
9/14/2020). 
James Brudney, from the Fordham Law School, suggested that it is standard practice for 
industry to send drafts of legislative language to an agency, something the policy diffusion 
framework’s learning mechanism confirms.  Normally, though, he said “it wouldn’t just sail 
through because there would be other parties involved.  That seems not to have happened here” 
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(Chadde et al., 9/15/2020).   UFCW#7, the union representing JBS Greeley workers, says it was 
never consulted by a federal agency or by JBS (Grabell and Yeung, 9/14/2020). 
Perhaps what is most tragic about the Covid-19 outbreaks in food processing facilities is 
that they were, most likely, preventable according to another ProPublica investigation.   In the 
early 2000’s, personnel like John Hoffman at the Department of Homeland Security’s food and 
agriculture sector were tasked with developing an emergency plan for food processing facilities 
in the case of a pandemic.  Hoffman said that Covid-19 outbreaks have “unfolded pretty much as 
the pandemic plan suggested it would” (Grabell and Yeung, 8/2020).  JBS and other major 
companies have argued that their outbreaks were inevitable and unforeseeable, but the 
meatpacking industry as a whole declined to implement the precautions outlined in the 
government’s plan.  A JBS Supervisor told ProPublica that while they had trained for natural 
disasters like tornadoes and floods, they “don’t remember ever talking about a pandemic” 
(Grabell and Yeung, 8/2020).  Implementation of the DHS preparedness plans would have most 
likely reduced the case counts and deaths from Covid-19 in the JBS Greeley plant and others.   
The Occupational Safety and Hazard Administration (OSHA) levied a $15,000 fine 
against JBS for two safety violations that support the allegations made against it in a civil rights 
complaint filed by several workers’ unions.  OSHA found that JBS 1) failed “to provide a 
workplace free from recognized hazards that can cause death or serious harm,” and 2) “also 
failed to provide an authorized employee representative with injury and illness logs in a timely 
manner following OSHA’s May 2020 inspection” (OSHA, 2020).  The civil rights complaint 
sent to the US Department of Agriculture for investigation goes even further to say that these 
inactions impacted their Black, Latino, and Asian workers disparately (Newell and Sinclair, 
7/8/2020).  OSHA has drawn criticism for levying a rather insignificant fine against the company 
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whose third quarter 2020 net profits surpassed $574.9 million. But, more important than the 
amount of the fine is that the allegations can be used as leverage in other cases against 
meatpackers, such as in a recently formed House subcommittee investigation on the Coronavirus.   
 
 
Figure 4 Colorado Commissioner of Agriculture Kate Greenberg, left, and Governor Jared Polis, right, hold a press conference 
(3/7/2021) at the JBS Greeley plant to announce a joint Covid-19 vaccination effort between the state and JBS (Morning Ag 
Clips, 3/7/2021). 
 
On February 1, 2021 U.S. House Representative James Clyburn sent a letter to JBS USA 
CEO Andre Nogueira saying that JBS was the subject of an investigation by the House Select 
Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crises, concerning the health and safety of their workers 
during the pandemic.  In the letter, Clyburn uses findings from the OSHA investigation and other 
reports to accuse JBS of refusing “to take basic precautions,” and showing “callous disregard for 
workers’ health” (Clyburn, 2021).  Clyburn’s letter focuses heavily on the outbreak at the 
company’s Greeley, CO plant, regarding it as one of the most egregious failures industrywide 
(Clyburn, 2021).  The letter calls out meatpackers like JBS who were granted waivers by the 
federal government to maintain full production speed after state and local health departments 
slowed and stopped production lines.  Plants with these waivers, its alleged, were ten times more 
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likely to experience prolonged Covid-19 outbreaks than those without the waivers (Clyburn, 
2021).   
Again, competition between stakeholders over control of the policy process occurred in 
ways not generally understood by existing, policy diffusion literature.  The literature has 
ubiquitously referred to the competition mechanism in a context where regional jurisdictions 
adopt policies in order to compete economically with their neighbors; e.g., a region adopts a 
policy to lower taxes on new businesses because it will give them an economic advantage over 
their neighbor (Berry and Berry, p.259, 2018).  Though, in this case study, the federal 
government’s initial policy response to the Covid-19 outbreak at JBS Greeley was done not to 
give one region an economic advantage over another, but was rather to help one sector of the 
economy, meatpacking, maintain an economic advantage that was being threatened by policies at 
state and local levels to close the meat plants.   
UFCW#7 President Cordova’s partially successful effort to identify policy problems and 
persuade policymakers at the state level to close the Greeley plant and test all employees pivots 
on at least two elements of the policy diffusion framework.  Her letters to the Governor, county, 
state, and JBS administration effectively laid out to them the dire need for a coordinated policy 
response between agencies due to the severity of the problem, as it was a crisis of public health 
and worker safety.  The letters forced the relevant agencies to engage in the learning mechanism 
as they communicated about the conditions at the facility and what an appropriate response 
would be.  Her rhetoric motivated these agencies to respond and to interact with one another, 
culminating in a process of policy diffusion, even if it was quickly stunted by the federal 
government’s policy response. 
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President Trump’s use of the Defense Production Act to force meat process to stay open 
against state and local orders exemplified hard coercion.  Another example of hard coercion is in 
the CDC’s request for the CDPHE to relax their mandates or otherwise lose federal assistance.  
Obstacles to policy innovation and diffusion in this case involve a lack of resources available to 
conduct mass testing and cleaning, and a lack of cooperation, information sharing and 
networking on the part of JBS, the White House and federal agencies.  Their failure to 
communicate and collaborate with other stakeholders in a timely manner proved to be a barrier 
to the learning process between the policy entrepreneurs, and a primary cause of the high rate of 
infection and death from Covid-19 at its Greeley facility.  Despite efforts by the WCDPHE and 
the State of Colorado to meet the demands of the UFCW#7, resistance coming from JBS, the 
Weld County Commissioners, the CDC and the White House allowed them to make only limited 
progress before six workers were dead and hundreds more infected.   
This one-sided policymaking process demonstrates how severe the consequences for 
equality and civil rights can be.  By favoring the interests of the meat lobby over all else, the 
White House, the CDC, and the Weld County Commissioners constricted the flow of 
information, a crucial element for the effective use of the learning mechanism. 
Case 3:  Equal Access and Diffusion of the USDA Farm to School Grant 
 
A haunting legacy of the 20th century is the systemic and racial segregation that lingers 
today, manifested often in the form of food deserts.  Low income and minority communities are 
inordinately afflicted by unequal access to full-service groceries. The US Department of 
Agriculture considers these areas “food deserts” and recognizes their implications for public 
health, racial equality and civil rights (Gallagher, NRS 2019).  Government has undoubtedly 
struggled to respond to the abandonment of inner-cities and rural communities by full-service 
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grocers, but in this case the USDA is taking action against food deserts with its Farm to School 
Grant program, which the Greeley-Evans School District is a participant in.  The grant employs a 
strategy of connecting school districts to the nearest farms and freshest produce, necessary to 
make the food system more equal and just.  The program’s success hinges on the learning 
mechanism and a collaborative approach by government entities. 
Many of the neighborhoods adjacent to the meatpacking plant where the workers and 
their families live have poverty rates between 20% and 40%.12  Ironically, although there are 
several, large food processing facilities in and around these neighborhoods, they are considered 
“food deserts” since they lack grocers.13  Before they became food deserts, they had strong 
relationships with groceries whose owners were residents of their neighborhoods.  But the 
consolidation of independent grocers into national chains eroded the connections grocers had 
with their neighborhoods and eventually led to widespread closures in inner-cities and low-
income areas (Deener, 2017).  Within the President Obama Administration’s Affordable Car Act 
(ACA) was money designated for addressing food deserts and school lunch quality.  These ACA 
funds supported the “Let’s Move” campaign led by First Lady Michelle Obama to target 
childhood obesity, and led to the passage of the Healthy Hunger Free Kids Act 2010 which 
allocated more money and programming for improving school lunch quality.14  
African American and Latino communities have one-half and one-third, respectively, the 
access that Caucasians have to full-service grocers and supermarkets.  An imbalance in the 
 
12 US Census Bureau. 2018. American Community Survey ACS 5-year estimate. 
https://www.socialexplorer.com/a9676d974c/explore 
13 The U.S. Department of Agriculture considers a food desert to be a low-income neighborhood or community in 
which more than 500 people (or more than 33% of the population) live further than one mile (ten miles in rural 
areas) from a full-service grocer.  Convenience stores and fast food restaurants generally compensate for the absence 
of full-service grocers. 
14 Obama White House. About: Let’s Move. White House Archives.  
https://letsmove.obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/about 
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availability of fast-food relative to fresh produce is directly related to higher rates of obesity and 
diabetes (Gallagher, NRS 2019).  Beef hamburgers and sodas are the primary staples of fast food 
in the US.  A single beef patty for a hamburger constitutes 25% of an individual’s recommended 
daily sodium intake and one 12-ounce Coca-Cola beverage has 35 grams of sugar, ten more than 
the recommended daily intake of 25 grams.15  Hamburgers, soda-pop, sodium and sugar are at 
the heart of dietary disease in food deserts. 
Over the past thirty years, total menu items offered at fast food chains increased by 
226%, with “large mean increases in energy and sodium” and portion sizes (McCrory et al., 
2019).  These increases were to the detriment of dietary health in the U.S.  Excess sodium intake 
is a significant cause of hypertension, stroke, and cardiovascular disease, and excess sugar is 
associated with a rising rate of Type 2 Diabetes and obesity.  Fast food restaurants are the single 
largest source of cheap, processed foods low in nutritional value in the U.S., and have been 
increasingly so since 1986.  Their abundance is a primary reason why dietary disease hits food 
desert residents so hard (McCrory et al., 2019).   
Descendants of the early migrant workers from Mexico still live in Greeley’s Spanish 
Colony, and a large immigrant and refugee community has flourished across the east side of the 
city.  Basic necessities that Braceros and undocumented workers lacked such as running water 
and electricity are much more available now.  But, food, the most basic of all, is still scarce in 
these neighborhoods.  A report co-authored by several federal agencies including the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the US Department of Agriculture, and Center for Disease 
Control found that while there are more than 60,000 residents on the north and east sides of 
Greeley where the meatpacking plant is, there are only two full-service grocery stores.  On the 
 
15 Sugar Science. “How Much is Too Much?” University of California – San Francisco. 
https://sugarscience.ucsf.edu/the-growing-concern-of-overconsumption.html#.XflfhC3Mx-U 
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more affluent west side, there are eleven full-service grocers for only 40,000 residents.  It also 
outlined recommendations for fighting dietary disease in Greeley’s food deserts.  Several 
involved more programming for “local food” venues.16  They concluded the following after a 
tour of the city’s east side: 
“Northeast Greeley has faced a problem with limited retail food access since the 
2014 closure of the only downtown full-service grocery store …  despite being a 
major agricultural producer, very little of the locally produced food is available to 
consumers in Greeley, as most of it is channeled through large distributors.  As 
such, the linkages between local producers, vendors and consumers are not 
robust…although Greeley is almost universally known as an “ag town,” local 
foods do not play a significant role in positive branding and placemaking for the 
community” (Local Food Local Places, p. 2, 2016). 
 
Unequal access to food in Greeley is one consequence from decades of policies that were 
tolerant of racism and indifferent to basic, human needs.  However, the third critical juncture in 
the historical summary was the Chicano Movement, which ended the Bracero Program and built 
a lasting foundation for promoting civil rights in immigrant communities.  The Chicano 
Movement’s resistance to systemic racism is still alive and well on the east side of Greeley.  At 
Al Frente de Lucha community center, volunteers and youth from the surrounding neighborhood 
manage a community garden to fill the void of a full-service grocer, in tribute to local Chicano 
activist Ricardo Falcón, murdered in 1972 in New Mexico by a right-wing vigilante (Al Frente 
de Lucha, 2020).  Though not directly partnered with one another, Greeley-Evans School District 
Six is working toward some of the same goals as Al Frente de Lucha, like fighting decades of 
systemic racism responsible for the city’s food deserts. 
 
 
16 According to the USDA Economic Research Service, local food is that which is entirely produced and sold either 
within a single state, or within a 400-mile radius.  Martinez, Stephen. 12/2/2010. “Varied Interest Drive Growing 
Popularity of Local Foods.” USDA-ERS.  https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2010/december/varied-interests-
drive-growing-popularity-of-local-foods/  
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Figure 5 Photos of volunteers working the community garden at Al Frente De Lucha in Greeley, CO, 2020 and 2017. 
http://www.alfrentedelucha.org/community-garden./ 
 
By participating in a federal grant, called the Farm to School program, is a promising but 
underappreciated way in which government policy is addressing the food desert problem.  CSU’s 
Extension director and organizer of the Colorado Food Summit said the following about 
leveraging public resources to fill gaps in food supply chains: 
“I think we actually have a lot of good underutilized programs.  I think there’s 
some challenges associated with getting some of those resources … There’s 
funding available. But we don’t even submit that many grants in the state and I’ve 
tried to get producers with these great projects to submit applications but it’s hard 
to do it, there’s some rigidity in the rules, so there’s just these sorts of barriers in 
place to even take advantage of many of the programs that we have” (Jablonski, 
4/2019).  
 
The USDA Farm to School Grant is one such example of an underutilized program that could be 
expanded.  The grant awards funds to public school cafeterias on the condition that they use the 
money to purchase food from local farms and dairies with the intent of stimulating the local 
economy, and improving the quality of school meals.  Farm to school involves: “(1) 
procurement: local foods are purchased, promoted, and served in the cafeteria or as a snack or 
taste-test; and (2) education: students participate in education activities related to agriculture, 
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food, health, or nutrition” (Christensen et al., p. 5, 2017).  Reasons why the grant offers so much 
potential are that it is more viable than most local food venues since they come with government 
funding and without the usual startup costs, and that they also replace highly processed, frozen 
foods with fresh, local food improving the quality and nutritional content of school meals on a 
daily basis, crucial for growing adolescents (Thilmany et al., 2019).   
Northern Colorado’s only participant is the Greeley-Evans School District 6 (GESD6). 
The district’s participation is recognized for its success.  All of the district’s schools are almost 
entirely supplied by fourteen farms in the Greeley area.  The district spends around $1million in 
grant money annually on local food for its cafeterias, and students at most of the elementary 
schools help maintain vegetable gardens and partake in nutritional literacy exercises (Christensen 
et al., p. 17, 2017). 
Farm to School is overlooked but among the best ways to better reach populations in the 
district most at risk.  Many GESD6 students don’t eat at home on a daily basis, but they do eat at 
school.  Nearly seventy percent of all students in the district qualify for free and reduced lunch 
(Greeley-Evans School District 6, 2019).  On average, more than 500 students each year 
experience homelessness and hunger.  Often, these students eat breakfast and lunch at school as 
their only meals of the day.17  Farm to school boosts the quality of these crucial meals, and 
instills nutritional literacy in the students.   
GESD6 received its first Farm to School grant in 2008 from the USDA to begin 
establishing contracts with local farms and dairies (Velazquez, 2017).  By adopting this grant 
program, GESD6 and school districts nationwide were imitating other pilot programs 
administered by the USDA first in Georgia and Florida and then elsewhere.  Technically, two 
 
17 McKinney-Vento Education for Homeless Youth and Children Grant School Districts. 2020. BOCES. 
https://www.cde.state.co.us/dropoutprevention/mckinneyventosubgranteeprogramoverview. 
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different pilot programs were being administered by separate offices within the USDA.  The 
USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Services (AMS) office and the Natural Resource Conservation 
(NRC) office teamed up with Florida A&M University in 1996 when they connected a 
cooperative of African American vegetable growers with local school districts as part of the 
Florida, Georgia pilot program.  In 1995, a pilot program was implemented in eight states by the 
USDA’s Food and Nutrition Services office.18  Both were merged with the creation of the USDA 
Farm to School Grant Program as part of the Healthy Hunger Free Kids Act of 2010 (Tropp, 
2019). 
The roots of the initial 1995 program are nestled deep in collaborative efforts between the 
USDA and the US Department of Defense (DoD).  The farm to school concept was crystalized 
by pressure coming from the White House to improve the quality public school lunches in 
combination with USDA initiatives seeking to direct more funding to small scale producers.  So, 
in 1995, the USDA’s Food and Nutrition Services office (FNS) initiated correspondence with the 
DoD’s Personnel Support Center,19 which led to a series of meetings and conferences.  Through 
these discussions the FNS hoped to adopt and imitate logistics of DoD food procurement in 
public schools.  Because the military’s food needs are somewhat similar in size and nature to 
those of public schools, and because the military’s procurement system was well regarded by the 
USDA, then it made for a good model (Tropp, 2019). 
There are several significant instances of policy diffusion to be unpacked in this example.  
First, in an instance of vertical, top-down policy diffusion, the GESD6 adoption of the Farm to 
School Grant Program was motivated in part by problem severity, since well over half the school 
district is at an increased risk for dietary disease.  The Farm to School Grant Program itself is 
 
18 The USDA office responsible for procurement of public-school meals. 
19 DoD Personnel Support Center is responsible for procuring the military’s food. 
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also a mechanism of soft coercion because it fosters policy adoption by incentivizing 
jurisdictions with a fiscal reward.  Without the grant, a lack of financial resources for healthier 
food would present an even larger obstacle to improving school lunch quality. 
In the second example, imitation and coercion explain the transfer of the DoD procurement 
program into public school pilot studies.  Mandates from within the USDA and pressure from the 
White House to innovate school lunch policy acted as mechanisms of coercion directed towards 
the USDA.  Collaboration between the USDA and DoD was then the impetus for a policy 
transfer in which the USDA adopted and imitated the DoD’s food procurement policies.   
Third, the learning mechanism is a function of the Local Food Local Places report conducted by 
the USDA, EPA, and CDC.  The authors of the report toured food deserts in Greeley, and held 
panels with local leaders so as to map the regional food system and make policy 
recommendations that included (but were not limited to) upgrades to public infrastructure like 
sidewalks and crosswalks to make neighborhoods more traversable; more open and green space 
and plots for urban gardening; and a campaign to bring a full-service grocer to the downtown 
area (EPA Local Food Local Places, 2016).  This exchange of information between local and 
federal parties as a way to innovate policy is a prime example of learning in action.  Even though 
this case demonstrates both an efficient grant program and an effective approach to policy 
diffusion, only $5million is allocated for it annually, nationwide (Christensen et al, 2017).  So, 
while it’s effective where it exists, expanded participation in Farm to School is prevented by 
financial obstacles to diffusion, something indicative of other similar and underutilized 
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Blending the methods of the policy diffusion framework with process tracing in this 
cross-case analysis provides a comprehensive narrative of the relationship between the policy 
process and decades of institutionalized racism in the food system.  At the January 2020 
Colorado Food Summit, I observed panelists discuss the most significant issues facing the state’s 
food system, which influenced my selection of cases.  Speakers at the conference included a 
variety of stakeholders from academics to grocery store owners and family farmers.  They all 
agreed that government policy is at the crux of health disparities stemming from food deserts and 
labor shortages being filled by immigrants and refugees.  By March, their concerns were 
validated by deadly Covid-19 outbreaks in food processing facilities nationwide.  The 
immigrants and refugees filling labor shortages in the food system also bore the brunt of the 
pandemic and showed that although the Chicano Movement dissipated in the 1980s, the political 
inequities that they fought persist.  Since policy adoptions by one unit of government are 
influenced by that of another in most instances, the policy diffusion framework proved to be a 
robust method for analyzing the origins of policies that either mitigate or sustain these problems.  
But history cannot be overlooked as the most powerful force driving such systemic inequality.  
Therefore, the study borrows the process tracing method from historic institutionalism to 
establish awareness of critical junctures from the 20th century that are especially responsible for 
modern inequality like food deserts, and discriminatory immigration enforcement such as Secure 
Communities.  Though recent scholarship has been preoccupied with the globalization of 
American agriculture during the era of liberal economic reform (e.g., NAFTA 1994) to explain 
inequality in the food system, we find that the roots of inequality can be traced back much 
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further to moments of upheaval in early 20th century Mexico, and US labor recruitment policies 
such as the Bracero Program.   
It’s also discovered that collaborative approaches to the policy process seeking a diversity 
of stakeholders and information are associated with the learning mechanism.  Demonstrated 
clearly in the third case about the USDA grant, they had the most positive outcomes for equality 
in agricultural labor by eroding the institutionalized racism stemming from de jure segregation.  
But in the first two cases, there is as much evidence of policy entrepreneurs achieving policy 
adoptions by shrinking the circle of influence and by mandating, or coercing, policy onto lower 
levels, which had deleterious effects on equal rights and opportunity.  Table 1 (next page) uses 
arrows to display the direction of policy transfers from one agency to another.  For example, in 
Case 3, the USDA adopted its Farm to School Grant by learning from the DoD, and Greeley 
Evans School District 6 adopted it by learning from the USDA.  In the second case, competition 
between the state/local health departments and the federal government gave way to coercion.  
The first case shows that coercive top-down diffusion was met with competition from state and 
local levels which forced the DHS to reform its enforcement policy. 
Learning and coercion mechanisms were demonstrated repeatedly, and imitation occurred 
once in the first and third cases. Competition was also present but not in a way traditionally 
considered by policy diffusion literature.  Problem severity and financial resources were the 
primary motivations (or obstacles) for policy adoption.  This study suggests once more that the 
unified model is the most comprehensive model in diffusion framework to-date.  While other 
models, like the national interaction model, would prove applicable, none would be flexible 
enough to recognize as many variables as the unified model.   
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Table 1 – Policy Diffusion Matrix 
 Case 1: Secure 
Communities 
Case 2: Covid-19 in 
Meatpacking 
Case 3: USDA Farm 
to School Grant 




after DHS task force 
consults with 
stakeholders, finds 









USDA --> DoD; 
GESD6 --> USDA 
 
School districts adopt 
lunch program from 
USDA after 
consultations with 
DoD about food 
procurement. 
Coercion DHS/ICE --> 
State/Local 
 
DHS/ICE use 9/11 to 
enlist support of other 






CDC forces CDPHE 
to relax 4/10/20 
mandates or lose 
federal Covid-19 
assistance, & POTUS 
nationalizes 
meatpackers.  




USDA to devise 
solutions to low-
quality school lunch 
and rising rates of 
child obesity. 







Wagon Train (2006).  
N/A USDA --> DoD 
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replicates DoD food 
procurement via 
Farm to School grant. 
Competition DHS/ICE <--> 
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Coalitions of officials 
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withdraw support of 
Secure Comm. & turn 
















 53  
Covid-19 outbreaks among workers at processing facilities left grocery shelves 
unstocked, illustrating how civil rights and public health disparities threaten the stability of the 
entire food system.  Each of the cases describe policies that put equality at risk.  But the last one 
in particular, about the USDA grant, highlights how the policy process can potentially improve 
the trajectory set in motion by history’s critical junctures.  The coercive tactics that the federal 
government used to facilitate the replication of Secure Communities at state and local levels, 
such as Operation Wagon Train and Operation Numbers Game in Greeley, were bound by their 
nature to cause the negative outcomes that they did.  By contrast, when the Department of 
Homeland Security chose to learn from the experiences of state and local law enforcement, they 
sought to adopt a more realistic enforcement strategy.  And, USDA’s Farm to School Grant 
Program is an example of how productive the policy process can be when agencies and levels of 
government take a cooperative approach by learning from one another.  Unfortunately, a lack of 
awareness and funding stand as obstacles to further diffusion of the grant program nationwide 
despite its potential to promote equal access to nutrition.   
Food deserts and other health disparities in surrounding neighborhoods are reminiscent of 
problems that Cesar Chavez, Dolores Huerta, and the UFW organized against.  Also familiar to 
the 20th century is the political contest over the policy process, between those who wish to 
increase political participation, and those who stand to lose in more active and well-informed 
polity.  Such icons of the Civil Rights movement knew that the levers of change were in the 
policy process and that they had to get people engaged at the grassroots.  Organized resistance to 
inequality has also been carried from 20th century into the 21st century.  Creating outlets in the 
policy process for such movements is essential to improving the entire food system, for 
everyone’s sake.  Without the generations of migrant, immigrant, and refugee workers as well as 
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political activists, who else could feed the growth of the United States, and the world, into this 
century?  
The Trump administration took for granted these contributions and ignored the civil 
rights leaders of past and present by neglecting to facilitate a legitimate, public forum for 
deciding policy.  Not only was it undemocratic, but led to grave tragedies for essential workers in 
the American food system and left life hanging in the balance for many more.  Employing the 
policy diffusion framework with approaches from historical institutionalism tells us that despite 
measurable progress in food system equality since the 20th century, immigrant workers and 
communities are still marginalized by the policy process.  Though, important not to overlook is 
the power that such communities are able to leverage in politics.  Progressive policy victories 
won by the Chicano Movement are the bedrock of a continued resistance against systemic racism 
in the food system.   
Future applications of the policy diffusion framework could be made more intriguing by 
further debating the competitive nature of the policy process beyond the general economic 
assumptions about, and the geographical applications of, the competition mechanism.  My cases 
show that competition can be quite subtle and difficult to tease out.  Cities and states don’t just 
adopt policies to get an economic edge over their neighbor, agencies also make alliances and 
rivalries with one another over certain policy problems, and they compete by transferring their 
preferred policies amongst themselves.  For example, until Dr. Mark Wallace retired from the 
WCDPHE as its director, he and the state of Colorado competed with the White House and the 
CDC (Fendt, 2020).  And, states like Colorado, California, and Pennsylvania took the lead in a 
competition with the DHS and ICE to reform immigration policy (AP Wire, 2014).  Under what 
conditions do agencies take a collaborative approach versus a combative approach to the policy 
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process?  Does a competitive policy process always guarantee a suboptimal outcome? Or, can 
competition be leveraged to break away from problematic policies? 
Another fascinating route for policy diffusion studies could follow an investigation of 
how to encourage activation of the learning mechanism in the policy process by increasing 
political participation, communication and information transfer between agencies and 
jurisdictions, and at the grassroots level with their constituents.  What incentivizes agencies and 
jurisdictions to share their experiences and policies, or not?  The most fearsome challenges 
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